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'· ABSTRACT 
.. The purpose of this paper is to view John Stuart 
-. "Mill's Logic of the Mora!_ Sciences. in terms of. a polemic, 
rather than as the outgrowth of his logic of the naturtl 
.. 
sciences. Traditional -interpretations have emphasized 
Mill's naturalism and inductivism; the interpretaticr/. 
' 
.. :-. 
emb~ed in this paper.seeks to show that a better under-· 
standing·-, .. of Mill's social method·ology .is effected, if one 
approach~s his work. from the polemic among M~-il.l, his . 
I 
/ 
I 
J father, MacCaulay, and Comte. This latter viewpoint has 
the virtue of presenting Mill's social methodology more 
systematically in that it·coherently incorporates Mill's 
experimentalism, deductivism, and historicism. Where 
applicable I have pointed out those places where Mill's 
position is in danger of contradiction. 
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·INTRODUCTION 
.. 
John Stuart Mill's philosophy.of social methodology 
.. 
. ·· 
' 
~ 
, .. , 
' 
has more than mere. historical rele:v.ance. Mill sought to 
effect a ·synthesis of three di'verg~t methods and·to combine Cl 
-
them into a novel view of social methodol9gy. By studytng. 
Mill we can learn how- far a. synthes·is of induct~vism, . . 
~-.~·c· 
. ~· deductivism, and historicism c~n b~realized given Mill's 
assumptions. A critical evaluation of his·progra,n would 
\ 
. \ give ·present day philosophers· und·erstanding of either) 
) 
~ 
' . \ 
,, . 
;t, 
~ fruitful avenue to pursue or a~_deadend. to .. be avoided. 
Mo·st who have de-alt :With Mill's social methodology / ' ~ 
~ 
. 
have done so by interpreting it as the.natu·ral~outgrowth 
and conclusion of the first five books of his Logic. This . \ 
approach, however, minimizes the influences of Comte, 
~ 
\ Mac_Caulay, and James Mill on the mature presentation of 
John Mill's social methodology. By interpreting the ·sixth-
book of the Logic as an integral part of the work as a whole, 
commentators have overemphasized the natural scientific 
•:, 
aspect of Mill's methods, and have, thereby, underemphasized ' , 
his historicism and deductivism. 
• . . 
' This paper is an.attempt to show the development of 
John · S. Mill's social methodology f·rom the point of. view of 
a polemic -- viz. the debate between his father and MacCaulay. I 
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T·ak~ng this point of view as. a starting point, I shall then 
see how Mill combined both of these methods with some of 
. ~ :··.· .. Auguste Comte's views· to come up with a ·new social· methodology • 
... ·;1 ! 
The interpretational viewpoint of this paper,.therefote, 
' 
is atypical since it does not consider the sixth book of 
. Mil.1 1 s !. System of Logic as. a natural outgrowth of the· 
preceeding five books, so much as it sees Mill's social 
methodology as a development of forces that were -- by and 
... large -- extraneous to the considerations of his\natural 
• - • # • .... 
sc i.en-ee methodology. Hence, we sha11 · here examine his social 
theory almost completely in isolation; t't is, ·we shall deal \ 
with it· in terms of the original polemic, Mill's viewsof 
Comte, and theA the "sy.nthesis" .Mill thought he effected 
between these three divergent positions. 
In 1830, when Mill was working on his Logic,·he was at 
~-
a crossroads, "for he did not fully grasp the nature or extent 
of induction. In 1830 an article ·by MacCaulay ~ppeared in . 
' 
the 11Edinburgh Review.11 which attacked James Mill's Essay ..9.!!. 
'('.I Government •. -' In his Autob·iography Mill noted: 
~-
"\ 
• • 
\ "r now saw, that as a science is either \ :.deductive or experimental, according as, . in the province it deals_ with the effects of causes when- conjoined, are or are not the causes of the effects t\Thich the same causes produce when separateo It followed that politics must be a·deductive science. It thus appeared that both MacCaulay and my father were wrong; the one in assimilating the method of philosophizing in politics to the purely experimental method of chemistry; wnile the other, though right in adopting a deductive_method, had made a wrong selection 
• 
I 
\ 
. ' ,'-If 
I' • 
~-
I.;. 
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t ' 
•, , , 
' ' ' I, \,: .. "::, '. t 
' ·:, ' ·.,:.._-.. .,.•>'I• ' ....-µ.....,--,,,._~-.,..--- rA~.,;.,...,.,._;,..----,-,,i,,c1·-,··~:·r,- •. ·.,:_·~~·~""--~""~·•--."•e---.o. • 
I' 
·, 
,;-
\. 
, ' 
. -of one", having taken as the type, of deduction, not the appropriate process, 
that of the deductive branches of 
natural philosophy, but.the in-_-
appropriate one of pure geometry.l 
' -· -
.. 
·With ·this insight Mill got a secure foothold into what he 
considered to be the nature of social · scien·tific. method. 
He avers, 
a foundation was thus laid in my 
tnoughts for the principal chapters 
of what I afterward published or the 
.logic of theJMoral Sciences.2 
< 
/· 
The aim of his social methodology was: 
to find out whether moral .sciences exist 
or can exist, to what degree of perfection 
they are susceptible of being carried; ··' 
and by what selection ••• of the methods brought into view in the previous part of 
this work that degree of perfection is 
attainable. (VI,i,l) , 
< 
' .ii,, 
. That is, Mill will start from the point of view of the 
-debate and then see how far he can S:pply his philosophy of 
the natural sciences. He believed that by generalizing the \ 
methods followed in the pri.or books to the moral sciences, 
he would be able to make the moral sciences scientific. 
{VI,i_,l) He.nee, while I shall start from the point of view 
of a polemic, I shall, where relevant, include those elements 
of Mill's natural science methodology. 
In chapter one I shall review the three methodologies 
-Mill considers; in chapter two we shall present Mill's own 
• method; in the last chapter we shall evaluate our approach 
.. to ~he problem. 
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I. THE POLEMic: 
.. 
I JAMES MILL'S DEDUCTIVISM-
. / 
' ' . James Mill believed that only a deductive met_hod could 
· be used in studying social/phenomena. John Mill,. in 
discussing his father's views, called his method.the abstract· 
or-g~ometrical mode of inquiry. 
The -p-rfmaGy assumptj.on under which induction can be { 
used is, according to John Mill, only when ea~h effect can 
be c~nnected exclusively with one cause.3 But this is not 
. posstble in the social sciences,_ for in society each effect 
is an aggregate result of many causes. 4 Hence, induction 
,,---
.,, 
cannot be the method best suited for explaining society --
\. ·' 
rather one must use the deductive method-. ~ I 
James Mill adopted the method of ge~ etrical dedu~tion 
\ 
to eJCplain social phenomena. John Mill remarked: 
-~-· 
In the geometrical theory of society, it seems to:be supposed that this is 
really the case with social phenomena; that each of them results from only one force one siqgle property of human 
···nature.5 /l 
That is, a~l'social causes can be reduced to a single factor: 
viz,,the law of self-interest. This law is the basic potulate 
of James Mill's methodology. An explanation of the causes 
of any effects in society are, or can be reduced to, man 
seeking his self-interest:· the prediction of· any future state 
of affairs can be realized by 1examining the self-interests 
.. of the parties involved. I 
" 
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• 
a 
,_ John Mill agreed with his ·father's deductivism while 
disputing his basic assumption; namely, that in society the. ~ 
basic cau·sative factor was that each· man sought his own "self-
interest. Men in soci.ety are variously mo,tivated; e.g., it 
is difficult to explain the preva~ent phenomena that men do 
6 The subordinated themselves to national callings, etc. 
causes ,apparent in socier_are many -- not one.7 Mill also 
criticized his father's deductions for they left no room 
for empirical verification of predicted results • . 
-MACCAULAY I S EXPERIMENTALISM 
.. 
-
' ' 
, 
MacCaulay sought with his "chemical" or ~xperimental 
~ethod to explain social phenomena by emphasizing experimen-
tation, induction, and empirical verification. 
~ ~MacCaulay 1 s basic assumption was that individual men 
were not the concern of the social sciences rather he 
emphasized the view that to explain a social phenomena one 
must concern himself with groups or with lnstitutions. 8 
In short·, to find the cause of a scitfi\al occurrence one need \ ' -. 
only to concoct an experiment, and from this (and oth~r 
experiments) one could make generalizati.ons based on these 
I inquiries by using induetiv tee~~ es. · In this way 
explanations of social phenomena could be effected.9 
Mill rejected Maccaulay's basic assumption: "Men are 
not, when brought toget~~r, converted-into another kind of • //~---~-" 
I 
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" • :· .... ,. q , -. -.i'.·., ,~;• ,' ' 1,;: 
*'~~-,r~~~".<;-'..,1/;-,.'-ii~.,~-,:,;.,,_.;;~~,-··:~.~.~ ..... :..:.-.,.;~,•---·-- .... -- --, , I ·,( " . 
. '\ 
. . . "' 
-
'• .. ,. 
., 
.. 
' · · 10 substance." That is, i.t is not necessary -to _st~dy groups 
' 
.in order to know why men- ~ct as they.·do. The social fabric 
is nothing more than a physical concatonation of atomic 
" 
_.,;P"-pa rt i c ula rs for Mill. This method also errs in suppo·sing 
- -I 
--- ~--
. 11 that it is p··ossible to experiment in societ-y. MacCaulay 
• ~-~ like Bentham -- failed to cognize that: 
in social phenomena the· composition of causes is the universal law.12 
• 
Now the experimental method is inadequate in that it tries to 
establish inductive generalizations of phenomena that have •-
many causes. 
, 
COMTE'S HIST6RICISM 
' J Auguste Comte in his Cours de Filosofie Positive proposed 
a historical method for the social sciences. Comte thoug~t 
that men study history in order to formulate the laws of 
change or progress. His plan was to discover how one anteced.ent 
state of_ society -- en toto -- pr9duced a succeeding state. 
He was not, in short, interested in why "a" caused "b" given 
·a certain stage of society. Rather, he was on another level 
'· 
where he wants .. to know how stage of society "a" causes stage 
~
1b 11 \ He called this level. of investigation the dynamical --
.. 
i.e., where one trys to uncover the laws of change. The 
static, on the other hand, endeavors to explain phenomena ,-
given a state of society. "By a study and analysis ·of the 
C.·, 
general facts of history [we can] discover ••• the law of 
/ 
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progress."13 Comte' felt that these laws would enable men 
to predict future events. 
Mill believed that the great shortcoming of this 
... 
approach is that the·re is no role for th~ verification of 
predictions; that is, Mill felt that the conclusions that an 
analysis of history can give can only be "emp1·r1cal laws. "14 Q ~ 
To be verified and hence to be universal laws, the historical 
generalizations must be connected to what Mill termed. the 
two u.nivers·al sciences -- ethology and psychology. The laws 
· of ethology {the science of character) and the laws of 
8 
· psychology "govern the action of circumstances .on men and of· 
men on circumstances. 1115 Comte did not realize this. 
.,. 
.1 
Tho-ugh each of these theories err fundamentally each 
does contain a kernel of truth. James Mill saw that a 
l 
social scientific method must be deduc·ti ve; MacCaulay belieX.ed . 
that deductions are worthless unless verified; Comte th~ht '--;::~ 
that a study.of history can uncover the laws that govern / 
changes of who~ ,so_c~eties. In the next section we shall 
see how Mill combines these elements into a ne.w :formula.· · · ·,: 
·'·. -.. ; 
, .... 
...... , 
-~ 
' .. . .... 
. "" ' . 
,f 
. .. 
\ 
., ~ , . 
• • 
\ • 
II. MILL'S SOCIA~ METHODOLOGY . 
. ,. ~ 
A 'PRIORI AND A POSTERIORI METHODOLOGIES 
... ; 
-
9 
J ' . 
·.' 
I 
. 
-
· A useful and informative starting poirit for under~anding 
·,·{.. 
... tri ' Mill.' s methods is his · essay On the Definition of Poli ti cal . 
-
------Economy. He considered in it the two possible~methods that :- . p • ' 
.. 
·., could be applicable in the social sciences: the apriori and 
..... 
JI' 
..... 
the aposteriori. · By aposteriori he meant "that which reqt.iires 
as the basis of its conclusions ••• specific experience; 1116 
. . ---) i.e., a~method of pure induction. Apriori method is, 
·reasoning from an assumed hypothesis; which is not a 
e 
· practice ~in~d to mathematics, but is the essence of al~~ 
s~tence •••• 1117 · · Apriori science reasons from assumptions, 
not from facts:~ aposteriori method is the inverse. Apriori 
science works downward from hypotheses to facts -- the 
-. 
· , · 
· 18 aposteriori method from facts to con~lusions. . 
Those moral sciences.which are apriori, i.e., deductive 
are, for example, political economy, sociology, etc. But 
-
I 
~ the conclusions drawn.from the hypotheses of these sciences 
.are but "·theoretically true", they become true by being 
empirically verified. This element was lacking in James ... 
Mill's methods. 19 
• 
I Hence, . the only method applicable for 
these moral sciences is the apriori (deductive). This 
is so primarily because experimentation in society is 
\. impossible, hencA the establishment of any conclusions --
~-. 
.. .... 
;,,-.· 
.. 
.!' 
, 
.• 
\ 
. ,I' , ... 
-~ 
• 
. 
. . . 
1'1' 
' 
- .. .. 
• 
demonstrative copciusions, that is -- cannot be realized: at_ 
10 
best one would end up·with a Baconian compendium of generali- • 
zations which would be merely contingently the cas~. 20 
·L --~-THE DIRECT DEDUCTIVE METHOD 
As we have just seen, much of science is a priori, or 
----deductive. The subject ma.tter of the deductive methodology 
is states of society or social statics -- what Mill called 
. ' -the theory of consensus. Social statics deals only w~th 
-co-existent -- and not successive -- ~enomena. A condition 
which governs the subject matter is that the effects and 
·· causes in a given stat-:e:· react ( or interact) mechanically 
and no~- ch_emi cally: 
The effect produced, in social phenomena, by any complex set of circumstances, 
amounts precisely to the sum of the 21 effects of the circumstances taken singly. 
Before proceeding, we should note that the paradigm under 
which the conclusions and procedures of this method proceed 
V is that of tidology -- for this science is indeed a science 
though.not exact. 
We will now consider the steps in applying this 
methodology. As noted before, social phenomena are a 
compendium of many given causes hence we· must use a 
deductive method the first step of which is: 
.. 
.. 
/ .. .. 
r 
' 
• L 
·-~ .. 
. ' 
. -
\ ' 
-
' 
. .. ,\,,.,; 
•. 
·• 
" . 
(~) the establishment of either 
(a) a generalization by induction or 
. 22 (b) a hypot·hesis 
~he next step is: 
,,.. 
·l 
(2) deductive confiusions drawn from th~ hypotheses • 
'I,, ,.._ That is, given A what must be; by deduction, for·example, B 
•...• 
and Care concluded: The final step is: 
(3) Verification of cohclusions23 
~ , 
Here the predictions made in s~ep two are corrobated or 
nega·ted by checking them empirically. 
' 
''\... 
.... 
Having stated Mill's direct ~ethod that deals with most 
~ 
of the social sciences a few remarks are in order. First, 
f 
Mill has fulfilled one of his aims -- viz., he has shown to 
what extent natural science methods can be used in the moral 
sciences. Secondly, he has incorporated Comte's 'distinction 
between the statical and the dynamical. ~ Third, we see here ~ 
the synthesis that Mill ~ffected between his father's 
deductivism and MacCaulay's empiricism -- all within Comte's 
I 
.,. framework. Fourth, it must ·now be asked: what status can 
\ 
.. ) these deductively verified conclusions have in Mill's system? 
Too, we must ascertain the limits and applicatio's of this 
method. 
·-There are manmy causative agents that function simultane-
ously in sociefy each of (ch produc~j its own "tendencyu. 
~Given this situation, the predictions that any one hypothesis 
., 
\ 
11 
'. 
.,., 
.. 
; 
' •' t,; c'.L ..• - • 
/) 
,. 
. -"~ 
. · .... ·r· 
. . ~ ~· 
,.. 
-·-
makes will at best be only a, "pi-ediction ••• of tend~ncies;• •24 · 
.. ~ ·, 
The rOle of verification is to check our predictiOns'~ainst 
these tendencies; in so doing Mill hoped to avoid er~or. 
Thus, sociology, "cannot be a science of po~itive predictions,· 
but only of tendencies. 11 25 Mill noted, however, ~hat, "a··. 
\, 
it..._, 
'-., knowledge of t-endencies ••• gives us to a considerable extent 
this p~er {of prediction)." 26· 
' Following Anschutz's lead we here must ask: does the law 
of the universal composition of causes deal with a surface 
phenomena or with the underlying causes of these phenomena. 
If they are phenomenal, Mill cannot hope for a demonstrative 
\ science of society,; if they are "real" he can -- but here he 
is in an epistemological quagmire. .Or, to put the ·question 
·, 
' 
. -
another way: is an explanation of ten'dencies, or of phenomenal 
- --Jequences {which are corrigible). 
.!I',( 
This consideration has 
., 
important conse~nces for Mill's deductive method: presumably, 
a hypothesis or a generalization is merely descriptive of a 
given state of affairs, it becomes explanatory when it is 
verified.27 The problem is: what is explained, a phenomenal 
,-
sequence or an underlying tendency. It would seem that-here 
Mill is using a realist appr0ach. 
A short note on;the limit of static investigations and 
~ _,# .... 
of the nature of this limi ti · In society this is a\~c·onsensus, 
\ 
"similar to that existing among the various organs {of the 
body). 1128 By consensus Mill meant that there is a constant 1 
and inductable interaction of all the elements of society given 
.. 
/ 
\ 
0 . 'r' 
" 
:/ 
,1:. 
' ,.: 
''I' 
;;_ 
' 
: . ~) 
• 
.. 
... 
.. 
.··\ .~ .. :~ . 
... 
t .. .. ,, 
· 29 any state of that society • He remarked· however, ·that 
. though this state of affairs i.s true, 1 t is 
h 
not the less true that different 
species of social facts.are in the 
main dependentoooOn different kinds 
of causesr and therefore ••• must be 
studied apart.30 
I 
' ' J 
/ 
· Some of those sciences which can and must be studied apart 
are, e.g., political science, sociology, ·etc. -
I 
As Mill noted it was not Bentham's opinions "but his 
method" that constituted ·the novelty of his work.3l ~e 
have now considered that method as used by Mill. The ( j 
d}stinctive character of it here is ·that Mill puts it within 
a new framework -- i.e., within the realm of social statics 
-- and he adds a new element; viz., empirical verification •. 
In retrospect, we-can see that this is neither more 
\ \r,.__ 
nor less than the so-called hypothetico-deductive method of 
' 
~ . . 
the natural sciences. As such, it was not in Mill's time 
.. ' 
an advance in thou~ht per se; its significance lies in the 
'fact that Mill takes this method and consciously applies it 
to social phenomena. In this endeavor Mill was a member 
of his age; he, Marx, Spencer, ,etc. were a new·breed of men 
who began to study society in order to understand it. 
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THE INVERSE DEDUCTIVE OR HISTORICAL METHOD 
. . 
· The inverse method of social methodology is. merely the 
) 
., 
/' 
. 
., 
. reverse of the direct deductive method -- albeit at ~ differe·nt 
levei.32 In-the latter method we begin with a hypothesis and ,... 
woik downward;· with the fo~er mode we begin wit1h empirical 
. . 
\ 
' 
' . ve·rities (i.e., that xis the case, etc.) and reason backwards-
" a11 to the probable caus~ or c:uses of a gi~n antecedent. 
It was an axiom of belief for Mill that to have a science 
--
··. of society it was necessary to be able to explain and predict 
society on -both a statical and a dynamiq)ll plane. Now the 
direct qeductive method avers, to do the former -- the inverse, 
the latter. 33 _Hence, th~ distinctive subject matter of the 
. 
. historical method is successive phenomena; i.e., of the_"laws . 
--
.. 
... 
of progress 11 • -In relation to this, the historical meth.od .· 
seeks to underst·and how one state of society ( consensus ttA 11 ) 
produces a subsequent state. of society ( consensus "B") . 
' The basic procedure of this method is to study the events 
of history and from these to formulate the laws of succession 
of sta~es of society .34 These laws are no"t merely empirical, 
rather they are second-level, or.descriptive-explanatory 
(predictive 'law), though they lack the universality of the 
laws of association. 
\ Now by a state of society Mill meant "the simultaneous 
state of all the greater social facts or phenomena." 35 Or, 
again, using the organic model, "states of society are like 
.. 
/ 
different constitutions or different ages in the physical frame; 
r 
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they are conditions ••• of the whole orgallism." 36 
Now the statics of .the laws that Comte achieved with his 
' 
. r-.:- ' · . 
. system were merely. empirical. Mill to rai.se these laws to 
' ···' 
a scientific level insisted that they must be validated (n-0t 
·verified) by connecting them with the universal and necessary 
laws of psychology and character.37 Once validated, it is 
. possible to escape mer~ empiricism, for the scientific laws 
will show us how it • that it is, 11 the whole which produces 1.S 
' 
• 
( whole. " 38 
For Mill, the story J.S not complete for he wants • a science 
of society en tote. Ta consider this, we now turn to his laws 
of correspondence. · Before leaving this section, r want to 
re-.emphasize the novelty of ~ill Is approach to the his 
l 
b 
method·: when ~-t~l{.ing Comte's basic idea of studying 
change he moulded it according to his~ idea of what it is that 
would make a historical generalization valid -- namely, the r, . 
integrating of soci~ change according to the structures of 
,, 
universal psychology. 
i 
THE LAWS OF CORRESPONDENCE f 
. Mill devotes but one section in Book six of his LOGIC to 
the "laws of correspondence." Here, as in so many· other 
\ 
places, what he intends is not too clear. 
"To obtain better empirical laws," Mili ·felt that it is 
I ~ 
\ necessary that· we ·combine, "the statical. vi.ew of social 
~ 
h 1th th d i 1 . n39 T d thi tt ti p enomena w e ynam ca ... o o s a en on 
' . -
' 
. , 
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,,; 
' 
· ·must be paid to both, "the .progressive. ch~nges of' different 
' . 
elements," and to the, "contemporaneous condition of.each,"40 
This done, it will then be p¢ssible to empirically obtain the 
law of .... ,correspondence. 
That which· corresponds, accordingly, is the state of a 
given .society (and all of its element$ ipso facto) with ·the 
"simultaneous change-s, of those elements."41 The law which 
would connect both kinds J of phenomena {of succession and of 
co-existence) would be a law that states the interrelation- . 
,, 
ship between both levels, i.e., how they interact. 
However, this law of corresi>ondence would remain a 
merely empirical law unless it were connected to the universal 
laws of psychology.42 Upon being validated the law would 
become scientific and thus not merely descriptive, but 
explicative and predictive. 
This law can be discovered, but its uncovering would be 
a, "difficult process of observation and comparison. n43 · 
• 
In short, what Mill looked for here was a law that: (1) explained 
the causes of social change; and (2) explained the causal relation-
" 
ships between the'various_ elements in a given state of society. 
, Va sans dire that it would have been a coup de grace if 
he could have discovered that one element, "in the complex t 
~\ existence of social man {that)~is pre-eminent over all others 
as the prime agent of the social movement. 1144 For this one 
middle-level law would be the key that would unlock all of 
,.. 
. · .. ~ ... · . . -  ~· 
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:. "1' 
" 
'I 
.> 
I 
0 
the causes of both successive and Co-existent phenomena • 
. . / 
I 
./ 
l 
' .r -
I 
Mill continued: ::,.-.· 
I 
There really is one social element which.-
is thus predominant ••• among the agents 
of sociai progression. This is the state 
of speculative faculties ofmanka~d, 
including the nature of beliefs. 
i /'·· ' . 
.. . 
' ' 
··~: 
.eqce~ the state of belief essentially determines, "the moral 
"~ 
and ~olitical state of the community, 1146 as well as the 
physical state of society~ 
I 
'·, 
,, --"", . ' 
This <\act, Mill avered, is corrobated by history; it ohly 
' ' \· 
· remains to be proven whether it can be validated, "by deducing 
~ 
it aP~tori from tlle principles of human nature. 1147 (~e. from 
psychology)~· 
-
Hence, Mill proposes that the basic law of correspondence 
is the state of belief of man. By possessing this law one 
! • 
could both explain how society changes, and how the elements 
of-each society are mutually related.48 
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I III.. CONCLUSIONS " 
,. 
. ~'-' 
•. ' "' 
Thus is the struc_ture of _Mill's social methodology. 
·rn it we see· many older theories blended together to form. 
t~ 
a new entity. K We see deductivism blended with empiricism; 
we see historicism blended with psychologism. Mill~~. 
social\ methodology is, in some ·respects~ like his poiit·i·cal 
economy. It is. said .that Mill's; economics makes Ricardo's ' . • . . . . r 
views intelligib~e.. In much the. same vein, most· of the 
elements in Mill's scientific method.are not new -- what·is 
:new is the Comtian context in which they are u.sed, and the 
way in which the .methods are combined. :j 
Mill sought to synthesize into one comprehensive 
~hod all of the best·that had preceeded him. Thus he 
did effect a synthesis of Maccaulay and James Mill on at 
least one level. This does not mean to say that his \ 
"· account is not without its problems; e.g. what is explained J 
-
by his methods, etc. This problem and others have been ., 
dealt with both in the body of this essay and in the notes. 
,, 
In the preceeding I considered Mill's philosophy of 
the social sciences from the point of view of a polemic, 
Mill's reaction to it, his incorporation of Comte's views 
--. all of which \esulted in Mill's own s~tement of the 
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"'· ' .true nature of social methodology. 
... The presentation of this paper has, . I feel·, helped ' . 
·in understanding to a higher degree Mill's final positio~ • 
· · By picking up the problem in this way, rather than dealing 
with it as an outgrowth of the rest of the Logic, the 
context within which the debate and the formulation of_ his 
social methodology took place is, I feel, and becomes, much .,...-
clearer than if one deals with. it solely in terms .of a book 
in his treatise on logic. 
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NOTES 
I. J.s. Mill, Autobiography, in Esse·ntial Works of John Stuart Mill, ed. Max ~erner· (New ·York: Bantam Books, 1965), p~98. ~ ·. 
.. 2. Ibid. 
· 3. J.S. Mill, A System of Lofic (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 19ot5T BK III,Ch. O, sec. 1. 
· Mill ~emarks that his five canons of induction (and thereby, mutatis mutandis, induction in general) and their use have certain boundary conditions: 
.. 
11 
••• We ~etve supposed that there was only one possible assemblage of conditions from which the given effect could result." 
4. J.S. Mill, On the Logic of the Moral Sciences, ed. Henry M. Magid (New York: The Bobbs=-Merrill Co.,. 1965), pp.69-71. What is meant by deduction and how it is used in the · social sciences will be taken up in detail in section four where we will treat J.S. Mill's social methodology. ~ 
5. Ibid~,PP• 70-71. 
6. This same basic pley is used by J. Mill in his Utilitarian-ism, where he broke down the monolithic explications of Bentham into a multicausative complex in the moral realm. I Both of these approaches underline Mill's basic sensitivity to complexities (albeit he was blind to them in othe~., spheres), and they ~lso highlight the view that more often than not, truth is a composite of many factorso 
7. The Moral Sciences, pp. 69, 72-73. The Bentham,Schoo}: "~~ •• founded their general theory of government on one comprehensive premise 
namely, that men's actions are always determined by their interests". 
Mill retorted: 
I. 
. i. 
"Taking the doctrine ••• an·objection pr,sents itself in limne (on the 
,.....-----~-ttiresh~ld), which migp.t be deemed a 
_ fatal one, namely, that so sweeping a proposition is far f:r;om being universally true". !, 1/ 
8. The-Moral Sciences, 
. / ~ 
i 
P• 59~' 
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'-1:> 9. The explicat·ion of this method is ·not clear; e .• g. ·, -how 
.. a~d. by what procedures does one experiment?; ho:W / does one· 
isolate ~the causes, et~o? Mill's exposition o0oth _· 
MacCaulay 0 s and his father 0 s _methods gives, at' best,~-
general idea of the nature and operation of themo Mill 
treated them as prefunctorally as he did because his main 
interest was to criticize them while adopti~g certai1n 
elements of each. 
10. The· Moral Sciences, p.59. 
' 
·11. :·Ibid., 69-78. In -this connection, Mill considers how, if 
4 
at all, one could apply his five inductive canons in social 
contexts. His conclusion is, in each case, that it is 
impossible to d·o soo Of course., what Mill does here is to 
e.quate all induction with his five canons -- each of these 
are a kind of induction by' elimination: ioeo, the antecedent 
of the consequent is not a,b,cj or d hence-it must bee. 
Mill thougtrt that it was virtually impossible to laloi1 when 
we have successfully el!~inated all possible antecedents. 
But to conclude from this that ail induction is not valid 
in society is to overlook induction by enumeration which 
merely seeks to establish probabilitieso Of course, given 
Mill's aim -- namely~ he wanted a demonstrative method 
that would both prove and di.scover the basis of a beli~f --
his statement is correcto Albeit, it is incumbent to him 
to prove this contentiopo See: Eo Nagellls introduction 
·to his John Stuart Mill's Philosophy of Scientit:ic Method, 
New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1950-;-xv-XVIII. 
.;,~ 
12. Ibid., p. 59. At this stage in the argument it is best 
to say that this proposition functions as a basic postulate. 
How Mill arri,ved at the conclusion that it was a universal 
and not an empirical law·would take us too far afield if 
pursued. Humevs problem is germane here~ given Millis 
empiricism how can he say that the law is universal? 
13. Ibid., p. 103. Here we, see~ new element, one over and 
above the two previous theories discussed; now-instead Qf 
merely explaining (by a historical analysis of causes) 
how one state of society produces another, one can now, 
by an analysis of the present state of society, predict 
what state will succeed the present one. Exactly how one 
·should go about this 11 totalistic" or 11wholis·tic 11 analysis 
Mill ·aoes not say. ' 
14. Ibiq. 
15. Ibid. :·.~ . 
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16. J.s.·Mill, On the Definition of Political Economy., in E.- Nagel John Stuart Mill Is Philosophy of Scientific 0 Method, (New York: Hafner Publishing co:-; 1950), p.24-24. 
17. Ibid. 
18. Ibid., p.423. 
'-
~ 
19. Ibid., p.425. 
.. "the, conclusions of political economy, like those of geometry, are only true ••• 
. in the abstracto" 
. 
A few notes of ·clarification are germane here: one, by moral sciences Mill means roughly what we today call social sciences -~-his usage, however is somewhat broader and narrow, for, technically speaking psychology and ethology are universal and true sciences~~ that is, 
1 their lai1s are universal and as such they "stand" over and above the rest of the moral sciences~~ more Will be said on this,. matter 1r1hen we deal 1r1ith the verification process oft\~, historical methodo His conception is broader in that moral sciences include art and morality 
-- we today would be hesitant to make this identification. Secondly, psychology and ethology are sciences whose laws are established by inductiono Mill considers them to be apodictico Of course, whether or not any induction 
-- be it eliminative or enumerative -- can e.~tablish such certainty is, indeed, dubitable. 
' 20. Of course, implicit here is the view that science 
21. 
essentially is a hypothetical-deductive endeavor that establishes certain truth when possible; probabilities are not, hence, scientific in a strict sense. 
The Moral Sciences, p.79. The relevance of this remark 1.s germane to Mill's critique of MacCaulays "Chemicalism~ Of course, the questions can be asked: how is this truth,,\ established and from whence comes .its certaintyo For Mill it is .a psychological truth deducible from the basic laws . of association -- hence it is apodictic. Then, of_ course, arises the question ·how apodictic are these latter? 
22. A major cause of concern here is Mill's lack of giving to the potential scientist a set of criteria whereby he could determine the relevancy of the phenomena in any given case. In short, what are the rules which determine what phetiomena are germane. ~ 
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23 .. A System, ··BK III, :Xi, 1-3· We see ·,now why Mill says that 
ne need only recapitulate the "proper method, 11 for i.t is but a restatement in book six·of his System of Logic of 
·what he earlier said in book three • 
24. The.Moral Sciences, p.82. 
.... 
Ibid., R.P. Anschutz in his work The Philosophy of J.S. Mill, (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, l953) stresses ihe basic logical-epistemological dualism-that colors all of Mill's scientific methodologyo Specifically, when Mill talks about discovering the tendencies inherent in social phenomena he is talking the language of a realist. Anschutz notes: 
•· •: 
"In regard to induction he (Mill) assumes 
that all particulars are expressions of 
underlying universals, and so he arrives 
at the conclusion that certainty is 
attainable by way of scientific experiment. In regard to the syllogism, on the contrary, · he maintains that ~piversals are merely 
collections of particulars and he allows us 
to conclude, therefore, that all inference is uncertain. n (p .180). / 
This latter view is a nominalistic contention. Anschutz 
notes, quite correctly I think, that it is impossible to get theoretical cor1:sistency if one maintains both of these 
views simultaneously. 
· · 
26. Ibid., p. 83. 
27. 
\ 
. 
' Here it is oportune to note Mill's conception of laws: the ultimate explanatory propositions are axioms or. 
universal laws (e.g., the laws of association); des·criptive laws are laws that have been explained -- a middle-level 
concept (eog. this would be a hypothesis that has been 
verified-); finally, there are empirical laws or mere, _ generalizations which have yet to be verified. Cf. A 
-System, III, IV. 
., 
28. Ibid., p. 83. 
29. This is the first mention of Mill's "organist~' conception 
of society. This will come to full flower in the discussion 
of the inverse\ method. We can note here in passing one 
anomaly: how can Mill rectify the view (1) that social 
· causation is mechanical, with the view (2) that society is paradigmatically like a physical organ? 
.... ( 
'· 
· :·. -.·. "··'·"iii·f 'TlflilTltrttfftlUP 
,, 
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. ,, . ,_....._.,. ,,,. - ---
•• 
\ 
30. 
... 
-
Ibid., p.85. The words,. "in the main", are· the problem here. Given the propos~tion that society is totally interactional how can anyone anywhere get scientific (i.e., certain) conclusions by isolating those causes·· 
which p~oduce certain kinds of social facts. 
31. J.·s. Mill, Bentham, in Essays on Politics and Culture, 
· ed. G. Himmelfarb {New York: Anchor Books, 1963), p.84. 
'-..,__ 32. Anschutz in his Philosophy of J.·s. Mill, ~.86, mtsses this point; viz., that the Inverse method deals with· · 
social changeo Anschutz also contends ·_(po86) that Mill 
really does not make any concessions to,MacCaulay 1 s 
empiricism and that he, at heart, remains·addicted to the Benthamite single-factor, abstract deductive1 rationalistic syndrom. Perhaps this ·is the case with 
·,' 24 
his moral philosophy, but it is the contention 9f this paper that he seriously entertained and aqopted ·MacCaulay's principie ~f empirical/verification., · -
\ 
., 
,,..,.~·')' 
., . ...,._. .· '--33. The Moral Sciences, PP•. 100-101. 
"The fundamental problem ..• of the·. social 
sciences is to find ~h~ laws ac9ording 
to which any state of societi produces the state which succeeds it.' ~ 
,34 • Ibid • , p • ~ 9 9 • ~. 
36. 
37 . 
• 
' 
"The question is ••• what are the causes· which produce, antl the phenomena which characterize, 
s,ta tes · of Society, generally." 
\ 
Ibid., Karl Popper in his Poverty of Historicism, esp. pp. 12-130,- unmercifully attacks the organistic model 
as danterous folly \and anti-d~mo.cratJ.,c ·metaphys-ics. 
. ') tf c, . 
. . Ibid., p.103. , 
"(These laws) .. can only be empirical.. • . The 
succession of :i states of the human mind and· 
of society cannot have any independent law of its own; it must depend on the psychological 
and ethological laws which govern the action 
of circumstances on men and of men on circum-
stances." 
/ 
· We again encounter Mill's mechanical paradigm of human interaction. It is obvious that this procedure of. 
validation is contingent upon the establishment of both 
· •. ,· .. 
1,1 
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38. 
39. 
40. 
41. 
42. 
. 
. 
·.) 
..r.;.· 
"' •: 
.. , .. 
. ' 
of .the scien,ces {Mill neve·r did say what the ~p~~ctic 
·laws of character were, for example) • Again w~ee Mill 1s tendency to simplify: how is the vali~ation 
effected; what
1
rules are operative., -etc., etc., etc. 
Ibid., P·:}4• .. 
Ibid., p·.115. 
Ibid. 
·"-Ibid. 
...... ~ .... ·- -
"•: 
Ibid. 
43. Ibid. Obviously, Mill is employing the inverse method 
25 
. ... ~ 
··:• ,. 
\ to discover this law. 
44. Ibid. This would be a· rationalist coup of grand design. 
45. Ibid., p.116. 
46. Ibid., p. 117. 
47. Ibid., p.118. 
48. It seems that Mill has regressed back to a kind. of Benthamite single-factor theory. What society is, he 
states, can be explained by the beliefs of man •. Now the 
theoretical question arises: does this pronouncement 
•• 
contradict his other axiom, namely, that in society the 
universal law is th·e composition of causes. . In short, has Mill regressed to a kind of rationali~tic· monism of t_he same ilk that he so vociferously attacked:when he 
criticized his father. 
In a sense, he has. Given that what he has said 
· here is an accurate reading of his intensions one could 
assert that yes, Mill has reduced all sqcial causation to the factor of beliefo But while belief is itself a class~ 
name, its members though not infinite are numerous. The 
structure of belief, as anyone honors, is, from the side 
of its content, variedo . 
Hence, Mill here reduces causation to a formal, 
single principle~- namely, belief. While, materially, 
the content of belief and, ipso facto, the nature of 
· social causation, is indeed a "composition" of many diverse elements. 
The question is, it seems to me, not that Mill has 
contradicted himself -- for I feel he has. not -- rather 
we must question his basic premise that the major independent variable that structures society is belief. 
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